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Abstract.
We inquire into architectural design theory1  to find ways out of the gridlocks that occur in the design 
process. When mining for guidance, it becomes clear that - to paraphrase biosemiotician Victoria N. 
Alexander - ‘we need to better understand creativity (poietics) to supplement and enhance our 
understanding of already-established habit (semiotics).’ (Alexander, 2013) Knowing the difference 
between a habitual  association and a radical novelty allows us to define convention and invention more 
accurately. It leads to an important implication for architectural design theories. We will learn that 
prescriptive theory that intends to provide direct solutions - or positive feedback - can only instruct on 
conventional design decisions - already-established habits. By implication, if we want prescriptive theory 
to guide toward innovating design ideas it can only do so by reflecting on what creativity is constrained by. 
Thus, an essential part of theory should provide negative feedback and address clearly what not to do, 
which conventions should be put up for debate, both on an individual level  as well as on the level of the 
discipline.
Introduction.
Is invention more meaningful  than convention or is it the other way round? Parametricist Patrik Schumacher 
argues to embrace the continuous drive for innovation in his recent treatise The Autopoiesis of Architecture. 
(Schumacher, 2011) New Classicists or New Traditionalists consider it wiser to choose working concepts 
over untested ones when it concerns the built environment. (Papadakis and Watson, 1990) Research by 
Design  protagonists Ranulph Glanville and Jeremy Till make a persuasive case for the academic quality of 
design by discharging creativity’s crucial role. (Glanville, 1998, Till, 2005) Thus, with many leading architect-
theorists the invention-convention-issue is either suppressed or ends up in oppositions and that is totally 
acceptable in a pluralistic  era. But, because of this designers today struggle with the idea of a meaningful 
task. As a result they feel  the need to legitimize their work by fabricating personal  design theories. And still, 
unfortunately, an equivalent of Francis Bacon’s skepticism towards logicians echoes through in running 
reservations towards design. Similar to the logicians designers follow ‘probable reasoning, and are carried 
round and round in a whirlpool of arguments...’2  in which there can be no true novel invention. It can be 
argued that as long as it is not made explicit what constitutes creativity these general reservations stay 
profoundly unanswered. Concepts such as invention, convention, and creativity need to be demystified in 
theory and practice. I propose to do so by inquiring into other knowledge fields such as complexity theory, 
emergence, neuroscience, psychoanalysis, and other.3  Patrik Schumacher’s full-blown treatise  opens the 
door for a reintroduction of a semiotical framework into architecture. Hence why biosemiotics is the solicited 
knowledge field for this paper.
Including a Practice Perspective.
Because, within this paper a practice perspective is desirable I will briefly introduce the Deltaclusters4 
project. [Fig. 1] In the fall of 2013 I participated, in collaboration with MikeViktorViktor Architects, in an 
exhibition in Knokke (Belgium) that showcased five design researches on future alternative development of 
Belgian coastal area.
Many challenges exist for the Belgian coast - as the exhibition outline goes - of which several  are existing for 
almost any deltaic area worldwide. Climate change will cause for seawater level to rise. The increase of 
rainwater will  put pressure on the river delta that drains the hinterland. As a result, the coastline is threatened 
by floods from both sides and it is extremely questionable whether the government can keep on financing the 
maintenance of the existing infrastructural defense systems, let alone invest in the necessary extra defense 
infrastructure. A lot of industry and related urbanity is located around strategic harbors. Together with 
profitable tourism the area most likely will endeavor to stay a qualitative built environment. To meet the 
challenges within fifty years - as set in the exhibition outline - the precautions that have to be taken go 
beyond regular intentions within architectural  and urban development.5 Today there seems to be a mismatch 
between the scale of regular architectural  and urban development and the large-scale operations that are 
required to turn and cluster certain parts of the deltaic built environment. Deltaclusters is imagined as a 
virtual part of any given deltaic  area that needs to be inhabited. Central  to the design of clusters of habitation 
the actor or agencies who can change the contemporary development process. The main message of this 
contribution was a call  to maximize the intentions in architecture during momenta of urban change. Four 
possible clusters were drawn up wherein economic opportunity meets with socio-political  necessities and 
societal support. 
So far the general idea of the case study is set. In this paper I will  show how the appropriation of knowledge 
from bio-semiotician Victoria N. Alexander results in a sharper design vocabulary. Appropriating her definition 
of both poiesis and semiosis led to a better understanding of creativity within this case study.
Architecture’s History with Semiotics.
Architecture has a peculiar bond with semiotics. In the 60s and 70s many tried to transpose the conceptual 
framework of semiotics to architecture. Often, as a result, this complicated the discourse more than it helped 
to develop it. Obviously, with this loaded memory in mind, to turn once again to semiotics can be expected to 
meet with a certain reluctance. But if we turn to (bio)semiotics today it is for a whole different set of reasons. 
Geoffrey Broadbent’s article ‘A Plain Man’s Guide to the Theory of Signs in Architecture’ (Broadbent, 1977) 
provides a good insight in the earlier semiotic episode within architecture. But allow me to first roughly recall 
two phenomena that lead to the situation in which architecture started to look toward semiotics for the first 
time. The classical  canon as a closed formal system - or language - was only problematized when the 
modernist project suggested that it obstructed the human emancipation. The representation of status had to 
be avoided. Remember the notorious arguments for a more “honest” architecture from architects such as 
Adolf Loos, Louis Sullivan, Le Corbusier, Gropius, e.a. But, as for example Summerson pointed out, the 
breaking away from the classical canon eventually had to result in a new architectural canon. And, as it goes, 
a new canon again started to represent something. Thus, representation always finds its way back into the 
architectural language. (Summerson, 1957) Let us consider another phenomenon that is widely accepted to 
have initiated the first semiotic turn. Many were convinced that by the mid 50s the meaning of functionalist 
architecture had been reduced to its single economic  cause. Architecture seem to have been completely 
subordinated to a capitalistic  system that reduced the architectural task to a superficial styling. These two 
phenomena, on the one hand the attempt to deny representation or meaning but to still end up with a new 
kind of meaning, and on the other hand, the anxiety for the erosion of the profession have lead many 
prominent figures to solicit the semiotic framework in the early 60s. 
According to Broadbent this first solicitation of the semiotic  framework was ambivalent. Next to ‘where are 
we on the subject of meaning in architecture?’ it turned out that the semiotic  terminology was fairly complex 
and thus difficult to transpose. The profusion and conflict of terminology within the field of semiotics itself 
made it even more difficult to find a wider acceptance. Nevertheless, it was key to reinstall  a new common 
language for architecture ‘... that will help us to understand all buildings better.’ (Broadbent, 1977) To do so 
the Theory of Signs or Signification which had been initiated by Peirce and Saussure was the general point 
of reference. The first fundamental  difference in turning to semiotics - today or back in the early 60s - 
presents itself. Whereas the first semiotic  turn was mainly intended to understand all  buildings better I turn to 
(bio)semiotics today to better understand the notion of creativity. Thus, in other words, the first turn to 
semiotics looked for a sign system that could theorize the whole of architecture, while within this paper 
contemporary semiotics is considered to be explicit about a specific moment in the creative process.
Although a thorough analysis of the differences between the semiotic  fathers, Peirce and Saussure, is 
beyond the realm of this paper it is important to highlight one crucial contrasting principle. Peirce’s 
conceptual framework to study all  aspects of signs is triadic. Saussures’ framework is diadic. For Peirce 
there are three parts of signs to be acknowledged: the sign or the interpretamen, the interpretant, and the 
referent or object. An easy example is the stop-sign. The sign is a board placed along the side of a road. The 
object is for people ‘to stop’. The interpretant is people understand to stop at the junction. A sign stands for 
an object which is interpreted through the sign. The interpretation is conditional. According to Peirce we 
interpret signs according to a rule, a habitual connection. This tenet is the cornerstone of Peirce’s 
pragmatism. In essence Peirce focusses on the behavioral aspects of the sign-interpretation. His triadic 
model shows a parallax between the interpretant and the object and the connection based on habits. 
Saussures’ model is diadic. A sign is made up of the binary relationship between the signified and the 
signifier. A famous example here is the relation between a ‘tree’ or ‘a drawing of a tree’ and for example the 
Latin word ‘arbor’ or the French word ‘arbre’. This immediately shows the essential idea of Saussure, 
namely, the signified-signifier-relationship is both arbitrary and differential. Arbitrary because the signifier - in 
this case the word ‘arbor’ or ‘arbre’ - that refers to a concept - or the signified - has no a priori or universal 
connection. Differential  because we understand the signs by what they are not. With this diadic  model to 
study signs the focus lies on the structure of sign systems. 
Why is this triadic-diadic difference important to architecture? Well, basically they stand for either a focus on 
purpose  or a focus on structure in communicative sign-systems. As Broadbent explains the first turn to 
semiotics in architecture resulted mainly in a structural approach to set up a new architectural  design 
vocabulary.6  If our interest today is not a quest to import a whole new vocabulary to structure our 
understanding of architecture but to understand better the purposeful behavior in a creative process we 
might reconsider Peirce’s pragmatic approach. 
The exploration of the semiotic knowledge field is often discouraged due to the plenitude of conflicting or 
confusing terminology. Broadbent mentioned this as a general  stumbling block. And this can still be the 
predominant idea if one turns to semiotics today. Much of recent semiotic  work focusses on improving the 
original terminology and triadic model  of Peirce.7 Arguments are made as to why one preferably should call 
the ‘interpretant’ a ‘reaction’ or ‘response’. Similarly the ‘semiotic  object’, in short ‘object’, is sometimes 
replaced by the word ‘referent’ or ‘objective’. And also the words ‘sign’, ‘symbol’, ‘signifier’ are used to 
substitute the difficult term ‘interpretamen‘. The fact is, however, that the meticulous calibration of 
terminology is only relevant for architecture to a certain extent. At least, if the subject matter is the 
understanding of purposeful behavior in the creative process.
On a Triadic Model for Architectural Design Theory.
To short-circuit a number of interpretation of the original Peirce model I propose to start from the very recent 
triadic  model of Alexander. It takes into account much of the critiques on Peirce’s original model that exists 
within the semiotic discipline. [Fig. 2] First, Alexander emphasizes the purposefulness by preferring the word 
‘objective’ over ‘object’ and, second, she replaces the word ‘interpretant’ with ‘response’ to make the model 
more generally applicable. She also argues that the main objective is a form of self-preservation or self-
confirmation. The latter is to be understood in the widest sense of survival. For example, if one responded to 
a trace in the sand as to recognize it as a footprint the objective is to reaffirm ones conceptual notion of a 
footprint. The objective is always to reinforce a habit of reading signs in a specific way. ‘This makes the 
triadic  semiosis more objective (to call  upon the sense of the adjective form) than the dyadic semiosis of, say 
Ferdinand Saussure, whose semiosis is inescapably subjective because it is not grounded in purpose, which 
either confirms the response or not.’ (Alexander, 2013)
A common particularity in the semiotic  conceptual framework is that a sign stands for an object that in itself 
again can be understood as a sign for another object. Alexander gives an example of a wolf reading signs of 
a scent of a rabbit to show how the immediate object, the idea of a rabbit, relates to a deeper dynamical 
objective, namely the survival  of the wolf.8  [Fig. 3] As mentioned before, the first semiotic turn tried to 
translate the entire conceptual framework into an architectural vocabulary and met with a growing complexity 
in terminology. Fig. 4 shows an example of using the progressive triadic model to explain a design intention. 
Due to the necessary finality on the one hand and the generalization on the other hand the example primarily 
proofs to be rather artificial. The result is too elaborate and hermetic.9 Therefore, I propose to reconfigure the 
diagram by looking at another similar model, namely Jacques Lacan’s conceptual framework to understand 
the individual as a process.10 Lacan too uses a triadic model - in his case to name all aspects of the self. 
[Fig. 2] Sign, Objective, and Response is replaced by the Symbolic, the Real, and the Imaginary. Lacan’s 
model had a big influence on critical theory which in turn had a strong impact on architecture. Arguably the 
linear equivalent of the model allows for a more simple representation of the combination of both circularity 
and evolution within the model. [Fig. 5] On top of this, whereas the semiotic  triad is rather elaborate and 
focussed on a finality, Lacan’s linear model is open-ended and brings more attention to the transitionary 
phase - the arrows in the models - which he calls the metonymic displacements in between two metaphoric 
states. [fig. 6]
It is important to notice that while Alexander’s diagram is reconfigured towards a linear model there is no 
intention to alter the understanding of the separate elements. I consider this reconfiguration more workable 
to make the link to an architectural designer at work. Design observations11 - the mental mapping of options - 
and dealing with design decisions - the mental strolling through options - can be represented by Fig. 7 to 
conform to the reconfigured model. Thus on one side, when the designer is observing examples, he learns 
that a particular representation can be associated with a (previous) observation or experience. On the other 
side, when the designer is about to make a contingent design decision, he relies on his habitual associations 
to introduce a possible experience through a related representation. In that sense evocation is a recollection 
of an experience that is projected on a new constellation. The whole mechanism of making a contingent 
design decision can be graphically expressed through an equivalent of Lacan’s linear model. [Fig. 8] In this 
model any designer will  recognize how a design idea matures throughout a design process. One could say 
that a specific design idea reaches a primary metaphoric state after which it metonymically evolves into a 
more mature metaphoric state until it is considered fit for implementation.
Now that we have established a basic understanding of how the conceptual  semiotic framework can be used 
to interpret the making of contingent design decisions, let us turn to Alexander’s definition of poiesis and 
semiosis. She defines ‘an “interpretation” as a response to something as if it were a sign, but whose semiotic 
objective does not, in fact, exist. If the response-as-interpretation turns out to be beneficial for the system 
after all, there is biopoiesis. When the response is not “interpretive,” but self-confirming in the usual way, 
there is biosemiosis [...] With life, semiosis (re-creating / maintaining) is the rule; poiesis (radically novel 
creating / adapting) is the exception.’(Alexander, 2013) In other words, when we talk about the arrows in the 
model - or the process of metonymic  displacement - she argues that due to the self-preserving or self-
confirming objective the response is habitual and thus semiotic. To have poiesis - understood as a radical 
novelty for the system - one has to deliberately or by mistake go against the habitual association. Only when 
the non-habitual  association turns out to be beneficial, and thus purposeful, to the system the response is 
poietic. 
Once an accurate definition for poiesis and semiosis is set Alexander offers a compelling understanding of 
autonomy. Self-reproduction means consistently following the habitual associations and, thus, repeatedly run 
through complete semiotic  cycles to confirm and maintain the system. Hence, a system is autonomous only 
if it is semantically closed, i.e. running cycles of self-confirmation. Creative behavior falls outside this 
semantically closed or autonomous system. Based on this understanding she states that ‘Francisco Varela 
and Humberto Matura (1974) misnamed their project, which they should have called autosemiosis rather 
than autopoiesis.’ (Alexander, 2013) This would merely have been a footnote to an architecture paper such 
as this one if it were not for Patrik Schumacher to have adopted the misconception of autopoiesis through 
the social  system theory of Niklas Luhmann, who based his notion on the work of Varela and Maturana. 
Central to Schumacher’s treatise is the idea of architecture being a self-referentially closed, autopoietic 
system. I would agree with Alexander’s implication that the autopoiesis of architecture should have been 
called the autosemiosis of architecture.12
For architecture to appropriate this precise definitions of interpretation, creation, and autonomy - based on 
the understanding of poiesis and semiosis - can be very fruitful. With these definitions a discrimination 
between invention and convention can be made more explicit. The notions of poiesis and semiosis as 
developed so far suggest at least two fundamental  levels of inventions. Imagine, for example, that all ∆t-
processes in Fig. 8 or Fig. 9 evolved along the line of semiosis, i.e. all design decisions follow conventional 
or habitual  associations. Due to the complex constellation of al  the sub-solutions, the overall  design can look 
fresh and new. We could refer to this as the emergent objective that is perceived as an invention. Another 
option is to talk about a semiotic  invention or semi-invention. Important to register is that the overall  exist out 
of a collection of conventions. [Fig. 9] If, on the other hand, in at least one ∆t-process a non-habitual  and 
eventually purposeful association is made, the outcome could be referred to as a poietic invention or a 
radical novelty.
Is There Poiesis in the Deltaclusters?
Before referring back to the Deltaclusters project I want to anticipate on two extrapolations a reader might 
make. The first one, in case of the wolf-example of Alexander, the wolf is not looking to be creative. A 
designer, on the other hand, often is. In fact, again, any designer is familiar with this deliberately self-
mistaking. For example, it is a common advice among architects to turn your drawing or model  literally 
upside down when you are stuck in the design process. When this helps this is a textbook poietic  act. 
Training oneself in such techniques can be part of the desinger’s task. Even more, to go against an habitual 
association in itself can become a habit. But I will not develop this idea any further because it introduces a 
tautology that is counter-productive. It would undermine the endeavor to learn from biosemiotics. Keeping in 
mind that the intention is to have an osmotic  enrichment and not to import a perfect matching conceptual 
framework.
A second extrapolation is introduced by the question ‘how and when to decide whether the poietic-act-to-be 
truly is a meaningful act that serves the overall  semiotic  purpose of self-preservation or self-confirmation?’ Or 
in other words, are there early signs of purposefulness within the design process? One could say that for the 
rabbit-chasing-wolf being creative happens accidentally. For example, he might follow a trace or odorant of 
which he instinctively thinks that it belongs to a rabbit. When it then turns out to be something else that he 
can eat he has completed a poietic  act without being aware of it. He does not realize that he was wasting 
time following a for-habit-mistaken-sign. Before he knows it the sign has proven itself worthy or not as a sign. 
A designer, on the contrary, knows he is drifting when he deliberately goes looking for non-habitual 
associations. And he is aware that the pathway to a possible poietic act might turn out to be extremely 
barren. Interpreting Alexander’s angle on the concept of learning is useful, however, inconclusive. She refers 
to a philosophical position on the self and the other, for which we have no concept.13  If fundamentally the 
other cannot be seen as not-self than we cannot learn about the other by the negative of the self, i.e. self-
negating, but, we can only learn about the other through notions that we are familiar with. Thus, a concept of 
the other is formed by mistaken notions that are familiar to the self. This implies that learning happens 
through self-mistaking and not self-negating. (Alexander, 2013) To refer back to the mapping and strolling  of 
a designer at work it is reasonable that decision making is the reversed process of learning. For a designer 
this means that although it seems that one can go against habitual associations one can only go so far as 
the deliberately mistaken associations are familiar. For example, a Rorschach image makes sense as soon 
as the beholder sees in it something familiar. It is widely accepted to call the pattern-recognition-ability a 
marker for creativity while, in fact, it is more likely to be a marker for semiotic or conventional behavior.
Within the Deltaclusters case we worked very consciously with this re-calibrated terminology. The main focus 
was to come upon a game changing approach. To arrive at a first metaphorisation of the main idea - to 
combine the top of the socio-political priorities - a spatial  configuration was designed that incorporates 
numerous references.14  With the aforementioned discrimination it is more precise to name all design 
decisions on a sub-level semi-inventions because they are all  developed along the line of habitual 
association. In fact it turned out to be liberating to recognize and accept the dependency15 of design ideas. It 
encouraged to be explicit about references. It allowed to channel all  attention towards a central  invention. 
Thereby releasing the stress of having to find novelties for every aspect of the design. A growing hunch, that 
being restrictive and not trying hard to invent, allowed us to work comfortably with very stringent design 
rules. For example, the entire design was built on an 8m10 grid in all three dimensions without any 
exceptions. In a similar rigorous approach cantilevering elements were excluded from the design option list. 
Again, this had a liberating affect. We could maintain a focus on the central argument. The goal was to evoke 
life in a future built environment with a minimum of architectural tour de forces. 
The Deltaclusters case study shows that we consciously remained aloof from imagining everything to be 
innovative. We are convinced, though, that a degree of radical novelty was reached at the overall  level. The 
clusters were designed within the conditions that would made them possible in the first place. This means, 
for example, that a stadium-like urban district would be built when a world-cup event or olympic games 
provides the momentum. It would be designed to anticipate contemporary societal needs. As soon as the 
cluster reaches its second life it is imagined to be the catalyst for a profound change of which the local 
society benefits. The stadium-like district would turn into a full-functioning urban district with schools, 
housing, offices, shops, etcetera. It should allow to deal with communal  requirements such as district 
heating, infrastructure, defense systems, and safe zones at cluster level. We imagined a different lifestyle in 
the Deltaclusters districts. Yet, not in the way of new identities or sub-communities. Rather, we projected 
existing lifestyles that already today have the intention to act differently but are in no position to do so. For 
example, a young family that wants to buy a zero energy dwelling in an urban context that borders on a rural 
landscape. 
Within the public debate that followed after the exhibition it became clear that we had changed the 
participants view on the architectural task. First, we had overtly assigned a direct societal responsibility to 
architecture. Second, the evocation and the overall design went beyond the mere projection of lifestyles. 
Proposals clearly met with existing challenges and necessities and, therefore, were considered to be 
appropriate. And finally, the design challenged the autonomy of the architectural discipline as it prioritized 
synergetic  solutions. These were all ambitions that we had learned to set ourselves, because that is how we 
came to understand purposefulness through various interaction with intellectual positions in architecture 
today. Every free association in the design process that bared a familiarity to one of these three ambitions 
was considered interesting to pursue.
conclusion 
To sharpen our design discourse we turned to notions of biosemiotician Victoria N. Alexander. Different than 
the first semiotic turn in the 60s there is no intention to internalize or appropriate the entire conceptual 
framework. What is analyzed is purposeful  behavior within a creative act or process. A notion that is often not 
made explicit in running architectural theories. 
Alexander’s insights on semiosis - the naming or re-creating of things - versus poiesis - the making or 
creating of things - reveal  a bit of a misconception of terms such as interpretation, free association, 
evocation, invention, convention, and creativity. Due to an over-emphasized idea of newness these terms 
are uprooted. To reach radical novelty one has to go against habitual associations and that is less evident 
than these words tend to make believe.
The idea that architecture is an autonomous discipline is permeated with the misconception of creative 
terminology. Self-referentiality and poietic  behavior are mutually exclusive. Thus, when self-referentiality is a 
fundamental concept for an autonomous discipline then true novel behavior is excluded. 
Being aware of this misconception in terminology changes how we see the decision making process of a 
designer. Design steps can only be made when out of several  curious options one can be charged with a 
certain familiarity - or conventionality. Because novelties are hard to reach they have to serve a necessity 
that is already present within the system one is designing for. 
The practice case shows that it can be interesting to re-calibrate elementary terms used in a design practice. 
But more importantly, it reveals that a form of theory is under-exposed or not existing, namely, that part of 
theory that deals with how to be poietic within architecture.
Fig. 1 Deltaclusters - contribution to the ‘Wisselland’ exhibition
Fig. 2 PeIrce’s triadic model and Alexander’s alternative proposal compared with Lacan’s triadic model
Fig. 3 This shows how Alexander understands the difference between the ‘immediate object’ and the ‘dynamical object’ of Peirce. At the 
same time it shows Lacan’s metonymic displacement at work in V.N. Alexander’s conceptual framework. 
Fig. 4 Here the progressive triadic model is used to show a design intention
              
Fig. 5 Lacan: the individual as a process - the linear variant of 
the triadic model
Fig. 7 Sven Verbruggen: A designer coping with a contingent 
design decision, based on Lacan’s model.
Fig. 6 Lacan: The individual is continuously reaching for a new self-realisation. The self understood as a process of metonymic 
displacement from one metaphorical state to another.
Fig. 8 Lacan’s metaphorical states alternated by metonymic displacement applied to a developing contingent design decision.
Fig. 9 Sven Verbruggen: A designer coping with a contingent 
design decision, based on Christopher Alexander’s model.
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New Urban Configuration?’ There I explain how design knowledge of Sullivan, Mies van der Rohe, Steven Holl, and others finds its way 
into contemporary proposals. VERBRUGGEN, S. (2014) Architecture, absolutely critical: How to identify a promising New Urban 
Configuration? IN CAVALLO, R., KOMOSSA, S., MARZOT, N., BERGHAUSER PONT, M. & KUIJPER, J. (Eds.) New Urban 
Configurations. Delft, IOS press.
15 Examples of the habitual associations I discuss at length in another paper ‘Architecture, absolutely critical: How to identify a promising 
New Urban Configuration?‘ There I explain how design knowledge of Sullivan, Mies van der Rohe, Steven Holl, and others finds its way 
into contemporary proposals. VERBRUGGEN, S. (2014) Architecture, absolutely critical: How to identify a promising New Urban 
Configuration? IN CAVALLO, R., KOMOSSA, S., MARZOT, N., BERGH
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